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CODE TREATMENT OF LETTERS OF CREDIT
Henry Harfield*.
INTRODUCTION
This is what you will read (if you do): A few philosophic observa-
tions about the nature of letters of credit; a discussion of things as they
are now, that is to say: the New York law, the ultra-national law to the
extent that it differs from the New York law, and the international prac-
tice with respect to letters of credit; and, to end the beginning, some
reflections on the question: Why the Code? This paper will deal, in too
considerable length, with the scope of the Code in so far as it affects
letters of credit; it will treat with each of the 17 sections of article 5
and try to set them in the context of existing law both in New York
and abroad and in the context of the Uniform Customs and Practice1
(or the international consensual rules) and, finally, it will conclude with
a few comments as to the practical effect of the Code on the letter of
credit business.
THE NATURE OF LETTERS OF CREDIT
Let us recognize the initial distinction between (1) the definitions of
letters of credit, which you will find set forth in the Code, in various
judicial decisions which antedate the Code, in the Uniform Customs and
Practice, in the books and articles which have been written on the sub-
ject of letters of credit,-and (2) quite distinct, the "nature" of letters
of credit. We shall presently deal with definitions. To do so is to ask
and attempt to answer the question "What are they?" At this point,
however, we need to deal with the double question "What are they for?"
and "How do they work?"
The letter of credit is an assurance of payment upon the performance
of certain conditions; it provides a means by which a person, whose own
promise to make a payment might be of dubious value, is able to obtain
* John W. Weiser, Esq. of the New York Bar assisted the author in the preparation
of this paper. A generous man would have designated him as co-author; a hypocrite
would have insisted that the omission to do so was in order to protect Weiser from
criticism for such errors or omissions as may be found in the product; the author is
neither.-H. H.
t HENRY HARrILD, A.B. 1934, Yale University, LL.B. 1937, Columbia Law-School. Part-
ner, Shearman & Sterling, New York City. Member, American Bar Association, iThw York
State Bar Association, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, American Law Inti-
tute, American judicature Society. Co-author, Bank Credits and Acceptances (1958). Autho
of articles in many legal and banking periodicals. Lecturer, Practicing Law Institute, Bank-
ing & International Banking. Member, American Bar Association Committee on the Uniform
Commercial Code.
1 Uniform Customs and Practice For Commercial Documentary Credits (13th Cong. of
Int'l Chamber of Commerce, 1951), hereinafter referred to as the Uniform Customs and
Practice.
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the benefit of a richer reputation, a stronger credit, which will be suf-
ficient to produce desired action.
A letter of credit always serves as a guaranty. This does not mean
that it is a guaranty. A letter of credit is an identical twin to a guaranty,
but the fact that the two things look alike and may be used for the
same purpose and are difficult to distinguish one from the other, does
not mean that they are the same thing and does not mean that there are
not differences, which, however subtle, are of major importance.'
Basic to any consideration of the nature of letters of credit is to
realize that they are financial instruments. They are not negotiable
instruments, but they are instruments which contemplate the payment
of money. While they are of enormous utility in facilitating trade and
facilitating the movement of goods, they are financial instruments and
not mercantile instruments.
They are truly international in their origin and scope, truly inter-
national because the origin and primary use of letters of credit was for
many years a means of financing trade between separate economies.
This was true even when the separate economies might be cities rather
than states or nations. In terms of the vast bulk of the volume of letter
of credit business which is now done, this international character (or
perhaps one might say this foreign character, in the sense that the buyer
and seller whose transaction is financed by the letter of credit are fre-
quently strangers, foreign to one another) is still dominant. This is not
to deny that a very large volume of domestic business is done through
letters of credit, nor to suggest that this domestic volume will not sub-
stantially increase. The fact of the matter is, however, that at the present
time the great bulk of letter of credit business is international in char-
acter and in all probability the international volume will not appreciably
lessen even though the domestic volume may increase.
The Letter of Credit as It Is Today
When we talk about letters of credit we are talking about a legal and
practical device which is in international use. Because this is so, it would
be absurd to adopt a parochial attitude toward the laws regarding letters
of credit. There is surprisingly little decisional law in the field of letters
of credit, especially in view of the vast amount of money and the vast
numbers of transactions which take place in this field. In civil law coun-
tries, of course, decisional law is not of primary importance; even so in
many countries where there is a relatively slender statutory scheme, if
any exists at all, there seem to be relatively few disputes. The decisional
2 Ward & Harfield, Bank Credits and Acceptances 133 (4th ed. 1958).
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literature in Anglo-American jurisprudence is, understandably, much
larger. But even here it is tiny in contrast to the volume of decisional
literature in other and perhaps less important areas of the law. There is
a substantial and consistent body of decisional law in England and
throughout the Commonwealth countries; there is a substantial and con-
sistent and clear body of such law in New York; elsewhere in the United
States there is a scattering of letter of credit decisions; but it is not too
much to say that in almost no state outside of New York is there a com-
prehensive and cohesive body of common law on letters of credit. Many
of the landmark decisions were rendered by courts other than the New
York courts or the federal courts, but it would be virtually impossible
to look to any court other than those in New York, combined with the
Federal Second Circuit, and find a complete body of letter of credit law.
The practice, or the reflexive activity which supports this very im-
portant business, primarily derives from international usage and that in
its turn has primarily been imported into the United States through New
York. Boston, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Chicago and New Orleans,
to name only a few important commercial cities, participate substantially
in the letter of credit business and are skillful in the customs and usages
of that business, but there is no doubt that they have come secondarily
into the field and that the primary conduit of the international practice,
which all of these banks follow, is the New York banking community.
It is further notable that in New York, which has been the center of
the American international banking community for many years and
especially the center of the letter of credit community, there is a modi-
cum of litigation, a relatively small amount of dispute, and a low per-
centage of uncertainty as to the operation of letters of credit. The law
of letters of credit in New York is decisional law, yet there are few cases
arising from day to day, or even from year to year which, in view of the
precedents already on the books, require any serious judicial attention.
The customs and usages which govern the daily operation of the vast
bulk of letter of credit transactions that never come into dispute, let
alone into the law courts, are recorded in the Uniform Customs and
Practice. These rules, or more properly speaking, this recording of cus-
tom, is as imperfect as all human writings and dictates, but clerks in
banks seem reasonably able to understand and to deal with it, and as a
result the business goes smoothly.and is handled expeditiously and very,
very cheaply.
We come then to the basic question: "Why the Code?" We have in
New York an international device which is functioning well despite the
fact that it involves the laws of foreign countries, the case law of New
[Vol. 48
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York, and a set of international rules with respect to the conduct of the
business. Why then should another and local set of statutory rules be
added? The draftsmen of the Code attempt to answer this question in
the comment to section 5-101, where they say:
Letters of credit have been known and used for many years, in both
international and domestic transactions, and in many forms; but except
for a few provisions, like Section 135 of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
they have not been the subject of statutory enactment, and the law con-
cerning them has been developed in the cases.
This provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law is no longer in the
Code . . . The other source of law respecting letters of credit is the law
of contracts with occasional unfortunate excursions into the law of guar-
anty. This Article is intended within its limited scope . . . to set an
independent theoretical frame for the further development of letters of
credit.3
There are those who feel that the proposed addition of a new set of local
statutory rules, either to be superimposed upon or somehow wedged into
the existing international industrial rules and the complex of case law,
is not a good idea. They feel it will only add confusion to a presently
relatively clear area. These critics of article 5 of the Code, and they
include in their number skilled and intelligent as well as merely respec-
table persons, might well adopt as their slogan the language from Mac-
beth (Act II, Scene III)
Confusion now hath made her masterpiecel
Most sacrilegious murder hath broke ope
The lord's annointed temple and stole thence
The life o the building
The foregoing comes from the mouth of Macduff, and is therefore not
an inappropriate reference for one who comments on the letter of credit
article of the Code, for it is to be remembered that the quoted remarks
were made by Macduff when he discovered the body.
Against this background and as a preliminary to an examination of
article 5 of the Code section by section, the scope of this article must
be considered.
Section 5-102 of the Code, entitled "scope" may well be regarded as
the most extraordinary statutory statement ever made. Its effect is to
subordinate the entire article to another set of rules. The subordination
is not to another statute, but to another set of rules which are not enacted
by any public body but by an industry. The subordination is not merely
to another set of rules established by an industry, but to whatever rules
that industry may choose to adopt from time to time in the future. This
a Uniform Commercial Code, 1958 Official Text with Comments (1959).
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is neither clumsiness nor inadvertence. In its supplementary report on
the Uniform Commercial Code (made to the Legislature of the State of
New York and dated January 24, 1962), the Commission on Uniform
State Laws said that the amendment to the 1958 edition of the Code,
which creates this subordination of the statute law of New York to what-
ever rules the International Chamber of Commerce may choose to adopt,
"makes clear and unequivocal the ability and right of banks to continue
to operate under the Uniform Customs and Practice in lieu of the pro-
visions of this Article, when they choose to do so."4
Now, it is a matter of record that the New York Clearing House
recommended that the article on letters of credit in its entirety be deleted
from the Code. The banks which are members of the Clearing House,
in common with substantially all of the banks in the United States
which do any letter of credit business, uniformly provide in their letters
of credit that the credits are subject to the Uniform Customs and Prac-
tice. The opposition of the Clearing House banks in New York was
eliminated by the peculiar "New York" amendment to the letter of credit
article of the Code. In fact, while the sponsors of the Code would not
go so far as to acquiesce in the withdrawal of this article, they capitulated
absolutely in providing that the article would apply only if selected.5
As pointed out, all of the banks in New York which do any letter of
credit business have, over the years, and as a matter of course, sub-
jected their letters of credit to the Uniform Customs and Practice.
The obvious result of this is that there is very little purpose for the
student of bank credits to examine the Uniform Commercial Code at all,
as it is quite evident that the banks will continue in their practice of
operating under the Uniform Customs and Practice and by this very
fact render the Uniform Commercial Code inapplicable to their oper-
ations.
Omitting the so-called New York amendment to article 5, however,
one returns to the 1958 official edition of the Code for an examination
of its initial and intended scope. Even omitting the New York amend-
ment it is obvious that the Letter of Credit article of the Code is not
an ambitious project. Subdivision 3 of section 5-102 frankly states that
This Article deals with some but not all of the rules and concepts of
letters of credit as such rules or concepts have developed prior to this
act or may hereafter develop. The fact that this Article states a rule does
4 N.Y. Commission on Uniform State Laws, Supplementary Report to the Legislature
of the State of New York 10 (1962).
5 The article also does not apply if the credit is subject "in whole or in part" to the
Uniform Customs and Practice. Quaere whether reference to one article of the Uniform
Customs and Practice renders inapplicable the entire article. The article is also inappli-
cable to credits which are subject "by custom" to the Uniform Customs and Practice.
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not by itself require, imply or negate application of the same or a converse
rule to a situation not provided for or to a person not specified by this
Article.
It is thus clear that the Code is not intended to be a definitive and
comprehensive treatment of the field of letters of credit. When this reser-
vation, which is made express in section 5-102(3) is coupled with the
extraordinary legislative innovation found in section 5-102(1)-the
deference to the Uniform Customs and Practice-it becomes obvious
that the study of article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code as presently
enacted in New York is, in its relation to commercial credits, nothing
more than a study of the Uniform Customs and Practice. It is conceiv-
able, of course, that issuers of commercial documentary credits other
than banks will enter the field to a significant extent and if and when
they do it is conceivable that they will choose to elect the Code rather
than the Uniform Customs and Practice.
In my view, these are wholly unlikely contingencies. The banks
which have voluntarily subjected themselves to the provisions of the
Uniform Customs and Practice for nearly a quarter of a century are
unlikely to abandon this procedure in order to adopt what is admittedly
an incomprehensive collection of rules intended only "to set an inde-
pendent theoretical frame" for the "further development" of letters of
credit. Indeed, the banks can scarcely be expected to do this, for they
cannot afford to do so. So long as they must continue to operate in an
atmosphere which is stimulated primarily by earnings statements and
by the necessity of operating in conjunction with their corresponding
banks in international trade, they cannot, even if they would, afford the
luxury of shifting to academic exercise within "an independent theoreti-
cal frame" for an intensely practical and competitive business.
It is highly probable, therefore, if not virtually 'certain, that the
parties now skilled in the issuance and handling of letters of credit will
continue to operate under the international usage which they have
followed for so many years, and it seems almost equally apparent that
even in the unlikely event that raw beginners and callow youths attempt
to enter this business, their very inexperience will make it inexpedient
for them to abandon the accepted usage in favor of the admittedly limited
and tentative Commercial Code.
For these reasons, I repeat, this paper should be, in effect, a comment
on the Uniform Customs and Practice. It was not so advertised, how-
ever, and, as a matter of fact, as good a way as any to consider the
Uniform Customs and Practice is to go through the letter of credit article
of the Code section by section in order to contrast those sections with
1962]
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the comparable provisions of the Uniform Customs and Practice. In so
doing one must be continually mindful of the fact that the Uniform
Customs and Practice cover a great deal more ground than the Code
purports to do, yet the Code deals with matters ignored by the Uniform
Customs and Practice. The two are not congruent.
With this cautionary background let me now proceed to take you
through the Code section by section.
Section 5-101 consists merely of the statutory reference,--the short
title of the Code.
Section 5-102 is the section which defines the scope of the Code and
to which we have already addressed ourselves.
Section 5-103 sets forth the definitions. There are those who suggest
there is a lack of precision in these definitions, especially in the treatment
of authorities to pay or purchase. It should also be noticed that this
section states that "a credit may be either revocable or irrevocable."
This is not a helpful definition, for it does not in any way aid the un-
initiate to decide whether a particular piece of paper is a revocable or
an irrevocable credit. To some extent alternative consequences as to
the irrevocable or revocable credit are set forth in the article (as for
example in section 5-106(2) and (3)) but the Code's casual reference
in these sections to revocable or irrevocable credits is to be contrasted
to articles 2 and 3 of the Uniform Customs and Practice. Article 2 of the
Uniform Customs and Practice states: "Commercial documentary credits
may be either: (a) revocable or (b) irrevocable." Article 3 thereupon
states "All credits, unless clearly stipulated as irrevocable, are considered
revocable even though an expiry date is specified."
It has often been suggested, and probably correctly, that this is an
outrageous rule and that, indeed, a credit should be treated as irrevocable
unless it conspicuously states that it is revocable. Whether the rule is
good or not, it is clear. The same cannot be said for the proposed new
law of New York."
Section 5-104 deals with formal requirements and the signature of
letters of credit. This section makes no appreciable change from the
case law of New York and is entirely consistent with the Uniform Cus-
toms and Practice, although its precise intent is not specifically repeated
in the Customs and Practice.7
6 It should be noted that the 1952 edition of the UCC followed the Uniform Customs
and Practice. Uniform Commercial Code, Official Draft § 5-105 (1952). The section was
eliminated to meet criticisms advanced by the Law Revision Commission. It also appears
that, in the absence of the Uniform Customs and Practice, some earlier cases leaned to
a presumption of irrevocability. See Ernesto Foglino & Co. v. Webster, 217 App. Div. 282,
216 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't), modified, 244 N.Y. 516, 155 N.E. 878 (1926).
7 Lamborn v. National Park Bank, 240 N.Y. 520, 526, 148 N.E. 664, 666 (1925); Bank of
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Section 5-105, which provides that no consideration is necessary
to establish a credit or to enlarge or otherwise modify its terms, restates
what has always been the law of letters of credit and in particular the
case law of New York. This particular issue has seldom, if ever, been
raised, but the student will look in vain for a case in which a letter of
credit was held invalid for want of consideration. Once again the Uni-
form Customs and Practice makes no specific provision with respect to
this theoretical concept of letters of credit, but the whole idea that a
letter of credit requires no consideration is consistent with the philosophy
of the Uniform Customs and Practice.
Section 5-106, dealing with the time and effect of the establishment
of a credit, is consistent in its subdivisions (1) through (3) with the
present case law of New York.8 There are no comparable provisions
in the Uniform Customs and Practice. Subdivision (4) represents a
variation from the 'international practice and from the English law.
There the rule as to revocable credits is that they may be modified or
revoked at any time, even after presentation of documents.' Only where
a credit of this nature has been transmitted to the beneficiary through a
bank is there a requirement that notice of the modification or revocation
be received by the negotiating bank prior to negotiation, payment or
acceptance. 10
Section 5-107, relating to advice of credit, confirmation and error in
statement of terms, is consistent with the Uniform Customs and Practice
and with New York law in subdivisions (1) and (2)." Subdivision (3)
represents a new concept, possibly inconsistent with section 5-106(1) (a)
and (b). Subdivision (4) is consistent with New York law insofar as
that law is reflected in decisions, although the precise point is not squarely
covered.12 This subdivision is also consistent with Article 12, the com-
parable provision of the Uniform Customs and Practice, although it
provides less protection.
Section 5-108, which creates the concept of a "notation credit," and
deals with the exhaustion of a credit, represents a totally new concept
in its introduction of the "notation credit." In one sense it is perhaps
Italy v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 197 App. Div. 150, 188 N.Y. Supp. 183 (4th Dep't 1921);
Bril v. Suomen Pankki Finlands Bank, 199 Misc. 11, 18-19, 97 N.Y.S.2d 22, (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1950).
8 Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 189 F. Supp. 922, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Bril v. Suomen Pankki Finlands Bank, supra note 7.
9 See Cape Asbestos Co. v. Lloyds Bank, [1921J Weekly N. 274 (K.B.).
10 Uniform Customs and Practice, article 4.
11 Uniform Customs and Practice, articles 5, 6; Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust
Co., supra note 8, at 927; Bril v. Suomen Pankki Finlands Bank, supra note 7; Sweden v.
New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949).
12 See Murray Oil Prods. Co. v. Poons Co., 190 Misc. 110, 74 N.Y.S.2d 814 (City Ct
N.Y. 1947).
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unfair to say that this is a new concept. It amounts instead to a resur-
rection of a concept once used, but abandoned by letter of credit bankers
in the light of their experience. The only purpose of requiring that draw-
ings under a credit be noted on the instrument itself is to protect the
issuer against the risk of double negotiation. Double negotiation is, of
course, a fraud. In the several centuries that letters of credit have been
used in international transactions there are not more than three or four
frauds recorded in the case books. It was on the basis of this rather
surprising honesty among the beneficiaries of letters of credit that most
issuing banks who would, of course, have been the prime victims of the
fraud resulting from multiple negotiations under letters of credit, decided
to dispense with the requirement that drawings be noted on the instru-
ments. This dispensation was due in large measure to the fact that the
requirement of notation was honored in the breach more than in the
observance and that, in consequence, the specific requirement of the
notation was so often waived that the waiver became the rule rather than
the contrary. 13 In any event, about twenty years ago, banks in the
United States and their correspondents abroad began as a matter of
practice to dispense with the requirement that drawings under a letter
of credit be endorsed upon the instrument. Their reliance was upon the
conviction, which may now almost be taken as a concept of law, that
drawings after exhaustion of the aggregate amount of the credit were
uncollectable in any event.
This, of course, is the rule which is stated in section 5-108 but unfor-
tunately the emphasis is placed where it has long since been abandoned
in practice, i.e., upon the requirement of notation and thus the salu-
brious rule, that one who draws and presents his draft after the credit
has been exhausted is without rights, is weakened by the suggestion that
it applies only if the negotiator has taken the pains to record the drawing
on the credit instrument itself. This is, so far as can be ascertained, the
first time that a "notation credit" has been honored by a definition and
thus introduced as an accepted concept; let alone a concept which be-
comes a statutory requirement. If the definition is in effect as a statutory
requirement then obviously section 5-108(2) is essential because the
existence of the definition as a statutory concept requires some rule to
regulate it. Unfortunately, the rule which section 5-108(2) attempts to
state is confusing, and in view of this writer, totally unnecessary. Sub-
division (3), which is an afterthought in section 5-108, is in fact an
13 Dixon, Irmaos & Cia v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 144 F.2d 759 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 850 (1945), discussed in Backus & Harfield, "Custom and Letters of Credit: The
Dixon, Irmaos Case," 52 Colum. L. Rev. 589 (1952), is illustrative of the trap which
inadvertent "custom" may provide for banks in the letter of credit field.
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attempt to state the total existing law and practice. In this respect again
it represents an initial effort at statement of a rule. There are cases
which are not inconsistent with this statutory rule, but this is the first
attempt to make a rule of written law. There are those who would sug-
gest the rule stated by section 5-108(3) is one which carries rough justice
to the point of brutality. It must, however, be noted that any rule may
do violence to one party or another.
Section 5-109, dealing with the issuer's obligation to its customer, is
a muddled and incomplete statement of the New York case law. 4 With
respect to subdivision (1), subsections (b) and (c) may be regarded as
desirable. But the over-all injection of the concept of "good faith" into
the letter of credit transaction is unnecessary, confusing and wholly
inappropriate. 5 Subdivision (2) of this section presents a problem in
its reference to the requirement that documents be examined "with care"
but this problem exists in the Uniform Customs and is probably inherent
in the letter of credit business. Subdivision (3) gives the non-bank issuer
a rather extraordinary advantage because such issuers will obtain the
immunities or privileges given banks by the Article, but are exempt from
the responsibilities which banks must accept in terms of the banking
usages and customs, which, over the centuries, have developed into a
rather valuable assurance of decency for the benefit both of customer
and beneficiary.
Section 5-110 states two rules: Subdivision (1) provides that unless
otherwise specified a credit may be used in portions in the discretion of
the beneficiary. This rule is consistent with articles 36 and 37 of the
Uniform Customs and Practice and represents an improvement over the
rule as there stated. Article 36 of the Uniform Customs and Practice
provides that unless otherwise expressly stipulated partial shipments
are permitted. The Code's choice of the words "portion of the credit"
instead of "shipment" is preferable. It gives effect to the broadened use
of the term "documentary draft" and emphasizes the letter of credit as
a financial instrument, rather than the mercantile aspect of the under-
lying transaction. A question which has existed under the Uniform Cus-
toms and Practice and which will continue unresolved under the Code
is whether or not partial utilization of a credit must be proportional.
Where a unit price is specified, there seems little question but that the
14 Uniform Customs and Practice, articles 1, 9, 11, 12. Bank of New York and Trust Co.
v. Atterbury Bros., Inc., 226 App. Div. 117, 234 N.Y. Supp. 442 (1st Dep't 1929) aff'd, 253
N.Y. 569, 171 N.E. 786 (1930); Bank of Italy v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, supra note 7;
Sztejn v. Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1941).
15 See Ward & Harfield, supra note 2, at 76-77 for a discussion of the essentially con-
flicting positions of the bank in a letter of credit transactions.
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drawing must be proportional; otherwise an operating problem is pre-
sented if the credit permits partial shipments or partial utilization, but
the initial drawing is disproportionate to the amount of the shipment
or the terms on which it is made.
Subdivision (2) of Section 5-110 has no direct counterpart in the
Uniform Customs and Practice nor does there appear to be any judicial
precedent in the law of New York. Certainly the rule would express the
understanding of letter of credit bankers and if there is no precise ju-
dicial precedent, neither is there anything in the New York law which
would be inconsistent with this rule.
Section 5-111 deals with warranties on transfer and presentment. There
is no precisely comparable provision in the Uniform Customs and Prac-
tice. Subdivision (1) is consistent with the basic rule in New York,
although it perhaps goes a little beyond that rule as presently laid down
by the courts. It is to be noted that the Code imposes upon the bene-
ficiary a warranty "to all interested parties." Under the present law of
New York, a negotiating bank clearly has rights against the beneficiary
unless it has taken the draft without recourse; and probably even a pay-
ing or issuing bank may recover back payment against nonconforming
documents on the theory of a mutual mistake of fact. There is grave
doubt, however, as to this latter conclusion if the nonconformity in
question arises out of defects apparent on the face of the documents (and
it is hard to conceive of any other nonconformity which would have
justified non-payment in the first instance), for in such case the bene-
ficiary might well argue that the bank's payment against the documents
as presented constituted acceptance of them and waiver of any dis-
crepancies.
Subdivision (2), while not paralleled in the Uniform Customs and
Practice, is consistent with the New York law and the British law.'6
Section 5-112 introduces for the first time a rigid rule with respect to
the time within which an issuer must pay or dishonor a draft presented
under a credit. The prior law in New York was found in the Negotiable
Instruments Law relating to drafts presented for acceptance17 but the
24-hour rule there imposed ran only from the time that the presenter
demanded that the instrument and accompanying documents, if any, be
returned to him. Thus, in effect, a demand for return in addition to the
mere presentment was necessary in order to start the 24-hour period run-
I' See Springs v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 209 N.Y. 224, 103 N.E. 156 (1913); Sweden v.
New York Trust Co., supra note 11; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay, [1918] 2 K.B. 623.
17 NIL § 224. See Brown v. Rosenstein Co., 120 Misc. 787, 795, 200 N.Y. Supp. 491, 497
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1923), aff'd, 208 App. Div. 799, 203 N.Y. Supp. 922 (1st Dep't 1924).
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ning against the bank. No comparable rule existed in the case of a sight
draft nor in the presentation of an accepted draft for payment.
Section 5-112 (1) starts the arbitrary 3-day period running from the
time of presentation and the deadline can be tolled only by an express or
implied consent of the presenter. The most that the rule appears to do,
therefore, is to shift from the presenter the burden of demanding return
of documents and to impose on the paying bank the burden of requesting
an extension of time in those peak periods when the physical volume of
documents is such as to make current inspection well-nigh impossible.
Subdivision (2) finds a partial parallel in article 10 of the Uniform
Customs and Practice.
Subdivision (3) defines the term "presenter" in a manner which finds
no parallel in the Uniform Customs and Practice nor in the prior New
York case law, but which is unobjectionable.
Section 5-113 purports to authorize banks to give indemnities in con-
nection with imperfect performance of letters of credit, in order to obtain
honor, negotiation or reimbursement. The right of a bank to give such
indemnity on its own behalf has always been recognized but to do so on
behalf of another has frequently involved exploration of the troublesome
issue as to whether a bank is authorized to issue a guaranty on behalf
of another; to encroach to this extent upon the business of suretyship.
No comparable provision is found in the Uniform Customs and Practice;
ordinarily the problem would not arise outside of the United States.
Bankers in most countries are just as shocked to learn of the limitations
in the United States upon what they regard as a normal incident of the
banking business, as are American bankers when they learn that a "bank
guaranty" is a routine and popular financial instrument abroad. Increas-
ingly the right of banks in the United States to issue indemnities, which
are truly incidental to the banking services which they normally provide
for their customers, is coming to be recognized.' The Code provision
is decidedly a step in the right direction, even though the corporate power
thus conferred is necessarily limited to banks incorporated in a Code
state.
Section 5-114, dealing with the issuer's duty and privilege to honor,
and right to reimbursement, essentially follows the existing New York
law.19 There is no comparable provision in the Uniform Customs and
Practice unless article 10 be so broadly construed (as perhaps it might
18 See O'Connor v. Bankers Trust Co., 159 Misc. 920, 933, 289 N.Y. Supp. 252, 270 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1936), aff'd, 253 App. Div. 714, 1 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1st Dep't 1937), aff'd,
278 N.Y. 649, 16 N.E.2d 302 (1938).
19 O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925); Bank of
New York and Trust Co. v. Atterbury Bros., Inc., supra note 14; Sztejn v. Schroder Bank-
ing Corp., supra note 14.
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well be) as to reach substantially the same result. In its essence, how-
ever, section 5-114 properly endeavors to set out a statutory framework
covering when an issuer may and when he must honor a draft, whereas
the Uniform Customs and Practice, being by definition a recording of
the practice rather than a statement of legal rules, does not expressly
attempt to cover the same ground.
Section 5-115 represents an attempt to deal with the troublesome ques-
tion of damages available under a letter of credit. There is no com-
parable provision in the Uniform Customs and Practice (as indeed there
could not be) and the rule which is attempted to be stated in section
5-115(1) is a peculiar one indeed. There is little law in New York on
this question of damages for breach of a letter of credit contract; what
there is looks toward a simple and consistent rule which probably will
not be changed by section 5-115(1).20
Section 5-116, dealing with transfer and assignment of letters of credit
and rights thereunder, covers approximately the same ground that is the
subject of article 49 of the Uniform Customs and Practice. Neither rule
satisfactorily disposes of this delicate and often exasperating problem.
Subdivision (1) of section 5-116 states the basic rule found in article
49 of the Uniform Customs and Practice and enshrined in the case of
Eriksson v. Refiners Export Co. 2 1
Subdivision (3), unless this writer has misconstrued it, merely saves
out the negotiability of drafts and demands drawn under a letter of
credit and if that is all it does, it is commendable.
Subdivision (2), however, represents an excursion in compromise
which winds up in Subdivision (c) with the mutual displeasure usually
found in such situations. It is to be noted, however, that subdivision (2)
deals only with an assignment or transfer of the proceeds of the credit.
The right to perform the credit is retained and thus unless the original
beneficiary performs there will be no proceeds. In most instances of
serious dispute, there is usually inadequate or no performance of the
terms of the credit and, as a result, no proceeds. As a practical matter,
therefore, it is to be hoped and it seems that there will not be a substan-
tial volume of problems which will necessitate reference to this section.
Section 5-117 has no parallel in the Uniform Customs and Practice
but is quite consistent with the New York law.22 What its effect would
20 O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, supra note 18; Ernesto Foglino & Co. v. Webster,
supra note 6; Linden v. National City Bank, 12 App. Div. 2d 69, 208 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1st
Dep't 1960); Meb Export Co. v. National City Bank, 131 N.Y.L.J. (June 30, 1954) p. 4,
col 6. See Ward & Harfield, supra note 2, at 81 ff.
21 264 App. Div. 525, 35 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1st Dep't 1942).
22 Shawmut Corp. v. Bobrick Sales Corp., 260 N.Y. 499, 184 N.E. 68 (1933); Alexander
T. Stephan, Inc. v. Bank of United States, 236 App. Div. 280, 258 N.Y. Supp. 289 (1st Dep't
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be if it came in conflict with the Bankruptcy Act is, of course, con-
jectural, but many of the cases dealing with insolvency of banks arose
in the Federal courts and the rule of section 5-117 which, as stated, is
believed to be consistent with the New York law, appears also to be
consistent with the law in the Second Federal Circuit.2
CONCLUSION
The problem of adaptation to article 5 of the Code varies according
to the point of view of those who try to solve it. In the judgment of this
writer, it will not present a serious problem to any of the groups affected
by it.
A letter of credit is a contract. In operation, it involves a complex
of contracts. It is itself a contract between issuer and beneficiary. It is
initiated by a contract between the issuer and the account party. It
ordinarily arises out of, but is separate and independent from, a sales
contract or other agreement between the account party and the bene-
ficiary.
Accordingly, the problem of adaptation to article 5 will vary depending
upon whether the person seeking to make the adaptation is the account
party, the issuer, or the beneficiary (including for this purpose in the
term "beneficiary" negotiators and bona fide holders of drafts drawn
under negotiation credits). In one sense it may be said that it would
be in the interest of all beneficiaries and all persons who negotiate drafts
drawn under letters of credit that the letter of credit be drawn as nearly
as possible in terms of a negotiable instrument, emphasizing the absolute
character of the obligation to pay and minimizing the importance of
the conditions upon which payment depends. Conversely it might be
said that the general interest of the account party is to emphasize the
conditions of payment and to minimize the obligation to pay. A mo-
ment's reflection, however, will indicate that unless these opposing de-
mands are neutralized, the letter of credit will lose most of its value.
The beneficiary who is in a position to insist upon reduction or absence
of conditions might equally well insist upon payment involving the use
of a negotiable instrument rather than a letter of credit; conversely, the
account party who is in the position to dictate extensive and onerous
conditions may not need a letter of credit to obtain his objectives.
The primary effect of article 5, therefore, will be upon the issuers of
letters of credit and upon those who negotiate drafts drawn under letters
1932); Bardays Bank, Ltd. v. Bank of United States, 236 App. Div. 150, '258 N.Y. Supp.
317 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 261 N.Y. 688, 185 N.E. 793 (1933).
23 See Greenough v. Munroe, 53 F.2d 362 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, sub noma. Irving Trust
Co. v. Olivier Straw Goods Corp., 284 U.S. 672 (1931).
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of credit, in reliance upon the credit itself. At the present time this
seems to mean that the primary impact of article 5 will be upon banks
and bankers.
The option offered by section 5-102(1) virtually eliminates the effect
of article 5 on bankers' commercial documentary credits. It does not
totally eliminate the problem of adaptation, because some question may
be raised as to the inclusion in article 5 of credits which would be re-
garded as documentary within the scope of that article but not as com-
mercial documentary letters of credit within the scope of the Uniform
Customs and Practice. For example, it is not now customary for banks
to designate their traveler's letters of credit or many so called "clean
credits" as subject to the Uniform Customs and Practice. Many of the
"clean credits," however, require as a condition to payment the presen-
tation of some sort of writing which might well cause the draft drawn
under the credit to be a "documentary draft" within the meaning of
article 5. It is even conceivable that where a traveler's letter of credit
requires notation on the instrument and ultimate return of the exhausted
instrument, this might be construed as causing the drawing to be one
which would be sufficiently conditioned on documentary transactions as
to come within the scope of article 5. The simplest solution would appear
to be a subjection of all letters of credit to the Uniform Customs and
Practice, notwithstanding the fact that most of its provisions will be
irrelevant to traveler's letters of credit or others which do not arise out
a commercial transaction. Put differently, the relevance of the Uniform
Customs and Practice will be in direct ratio to the relationship of the
particular letter of credit to a commercial transaction, but even in the
case of a traveler's letter of credit, subjection to the Uniform Customs
and Practice would not be meaningless.
Alternatively, failure to divert the impact of article 5 on traveler's
and clean letters of credit through reference to the Uniform Customs
and Practice, would probably result in few dislocations from the existing
manner in which such instruments are handled.
In short, it is the view of this writer that article 5 will have little
effect upon the conduct of the letter of credit business in New York.
With respect to the bulk of that business, the probable continuance of
the present selection by banks of the Uniform Customs and Practice as
the governing regulation means that the article will have no application
whatsoever. To the extent that some phases of the business are not
covered by the Uniform Customs and Practice, there will be little need
for change in the practical, day-to-day operation of that sort of credit.
So far as nonbankers are concerned, that is to say the account parties
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and the beneficiaries, as most of them deal with banks the conclusion
with respect to the effect of the article on banks will apply as well to
nonbank users of the letter of credit.
Whether or not the article, applies, the task of the prudent business-
man will continue to be the same; he must, with respect to each specific
letter of credit transaction, satisfy himself as to what his commercial
necessities are and as to the extent to which the issuer of the credit is
prepared to incorporate those necessities as terms of the credit; he must
satisfy himself as to the kind of obligation, if any, he has received from
the issuer; and in short must continue to exercise reasonable discretion
in the conduct of his affairs.
In considering article 5 of the Code it may well be said that the
product of the mountainous effort which has gone into the project is a
mouse, but it is a white mouse and not altogether disagreeable.
